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1. Introduction 
Risk assessment has been used to analyze a wide range of industries to determine 
vulnerabilities with the ultimate purpose of eliminating the sources of risk or reducing 
them to a reasonable level.  The purpose of this chapter is to show how risk assessment 
tools can be used to develop risk models of aviation maintenance tasks.  Two tools will be 
discussed in this chapter, though many other methods exist.  The tools discussed in this 
chapter are: 
 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) 
 Event and Fault Tree Analysis  
Ostrom and Wilhelmsen (2011) discuss a wide range of risk assessment tools and this book 
provides many examples of how these tools are used to analyze various industries.   
2. Failure mode and effect analysis 
An FMEA is a detailed document that identifies ways in which a process or product can fail 
to meet critical requirements.  It is a living document that lists all the possible causes of 
failure from which a list of items can be generated to determine types of controls or where 
changes in the procedures should be made to reduce or mitigate risk.  The FMEA also 
allows procedure developers to prioritize and track procedure changes (Mil Std 882B, C, 
1984 and 1993).  The process is effective because it provides a very systematic process for 
evaluating a system or a procedure, in this instance.  It provides a means for identifying and 
documenting: 
1. Potential areas of failure in process, system, component, or procedure. 
2. Potential effects of the process, system, component, or procedure failing. 
3. Potential failure causes. 
4. Methods of reducing the probability of failure. 
5. Methods of improving the means of detecting the causes of failure. 
6. Risk ranking of failures, allowing risk informed decisions by those responsible. 
7. A starting point from which the control plan can be created. 
FMEA can be used to analyze: 
1. Process: Documents and addresses failure modes associated with the manufacturing 
and assembly process. 
2. Procedure: Documents and addresses failure points and modes in procedures. 
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3. Software: Documents and addresses failure modes associated with software functions. 
4. Design: Documents and addresses failure modes of products and components long 
before they are manufactured and should always be completed well in advance of 
prototype build. 
5. System: Documents and addresses failure modes for system and subsystem level 
functions early in the product concept stage. 
6. Project: Documents and addresses failures that could happen during a major program. 
A procedure analysis will be used to demonstrate how an FMEA can be conducted. An 
FMEA is conducted on a step-by-step basis.  Table 1 shows an example of an FMEA table.  
The following constitutes the steps of an FMEA.  These steps will be illustrated by use of an 
example.   
 
Item 
Potential 
Failure 
Mode 
Cause of 
Failure 
Possible 
Effects 
Probability
Criticality 
(Optional) 
Prevention 
Step in 
procedure, 
part, or 
component 
How it can 
fail: 
–pump not 
working 
–stuck valve
–no money 
in a checking 
account 
–broken wire
–software 
error 
–system 
down 
–reactor 
melting 
down 
What 
caused the 
failure: 
Broken part
Electrical 
failure 
Human 
error 
Explosion
Bug in 
software 
Outcome of 
the failures: 
Nothing 
System crash
Explosion 
Fire 
Accident 
Environmental 
release 
How 
possible     
is it: 
Can use 
numeric 
values: 
0.1, 0.01, or
1E-5 
Can use a 
qualitative 
measure: 
Negligible, 
low 
probability, 
high 
probability.
How bad are 
the results: 
Can use 
dollar value: 
$10., $1,000., 
or $1,000,000 
Can use a 
qualitative 
measure: 
Nil, Minimal 
problems, 
major 
problems. 
What can 
be done to 
prevent 
either 
failures or 
results of 
the 
failures? 
Table 1. Example FMEA Table 
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The first step is to create a flow diagram of the procedure.  This is a relatively simple process 
in which a table or block diagram is constructed that shows the steps in the procedure.  
Table 2 shows the simple steps checking an engine chip detector.  Note that this is a simple 
example and not an exhaustive analysis.  Table 3 lists the major, credible failures associated 
with each step in the process.  Table 4 shows the effect of the potential failures.  Table 5 
shows the complete FMEA for the task. 
 
 
Table 2. Process Steps for checking a chip detector 
FMEA is a relatively simple, but powerful tool and has a wide range of applicability for 
analyzing aircraft maintenance tasks. 
3. Event tree and fault tree analysis 
An event tree is a graphical representation of a series of possible events in an accident 
sequence (Vesely, William; et. al., 2002). Using this approach assumes that as each event 
occurs there are only two outcomes, failure or success. A success ends the accident sequence 
and the postulated outcome is either that the accident sequence terminated successfully or 
was mitigated successfully. For instance, a fire starts in an engine. This is the initiating 
event. Then the automated system closes fuel feed.  If the lack of fuel does not extinguish the 
fire, the next step is that that the fire suppression system is challenged.  If the system 
actuates the fire suppression system the fire is suppressed and the event sequence ends.  If 
the fire suppression system fails the fire is not suppressed then the accident sequence 
progresses.  Table 6 shows this postulated accident sequence. Figure 1 shows this accident 
sequence in an event tree. 
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As in most of the risk assessment techniques, probabilities can be assigned to the events and 
combined using the appropriate Boolean Logic to develop an overall probability for the 
various paths in the event.  Using our example from above, we will now add probabilities to 
the events and show how the probabilities combine for each path. Figure 2 shows the 
addition of path probability to the event tree. 
 
Inspecting Chip Detector 
Process Steps Major Failures 
Cut and Remove Lock Wire from Oil Drain 
Plug 
No major failures that affect process outcome 
Remove Oil Drain Plug No major failures that affect process outcome 
Drain Oil No major failures that affect process outcome 
Cut and Remove Lock Wire from Chip 
Detector 
No major failures that affect process outcome 
Remove Chip Detector 
Improper removal can remove debris from chip 
detector and cause false reading.  Chip detector 
can be damaged if improperly removed. 
Examine Chip Detector 
Aircraft Maintenance Technician (AMT) fails to 
notice debris on chip detector. 
Clean Chip Detector AMT fails to properly clean chip detector 
Replace Chip Detector AMT fails to properly install chip detector 
Lock Wire Chip Detector AMT fails to properly lock wire chip detector 
Replace Oil Drain Plug AMT fails to properly install oil drain plug 
Lock Wire Oil Drain Plug AMT fails to properly lock oil drain plug 
Replace Oil AMT fails to properly replace oil 
Table 3. Failures Associated with Each Step 
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Inspecting Chip Detector 
Process Steps Potential Failure Modes Potential Failure Effects 
Remove Chip Detector 
Improper removal can remove 
debris from chip detector and 
cause false reading.  Chip 
detector can be damaged if 
improperly removed. 
Engine could fail if chips are 
not properly detected. 
 
Added cost to replace 
damaged chip detector. 
Examine Chip Detector 
Aircraft Maintenance 
Technician (AMT) fails to 
notice debris on chip detector.
 
Engine could fail if chips are 
not properly detected. 
Clean Chip Detector 
AMT fails to properly clean 
chip detector 
Debris could be placed back 
into engine. 
Replace Chip Detector 
AMT fails to properly install 
chip detector 
Oil could leak past chip 
detector. 
Threads of chip detector 
could be damaged. 
Lock Wire Chip Detector 
AMT fails to properly lock 
wire chip detector 
Chip detector could become 
lose and fall out, leading to 
loss of engine oil. 
Replace Oil Drain Plug 
AMT fails to properly install 
oil drain plug 
Engine oil could leak out. 
Oil drain plug could become 
damaged. 
Lock Wire Oil Drain Plug 
AMT fails to properly lock oil 
drain plug 
Oil drain plug could become 
loose and fall out. 
Oil drain plug could become 
damaged. 
Replace Oil 
AMT fails to properly replace 
oil 
Engine could fail. 
Table 4. Effect of Potential Failures 
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Procedure Step 
Potential Failure 
Mode
Cause of 
Failure
Possible Effects Probability Criticality Prevention 
Cut and 
Remove Lock 
Wire from Oil 
Drain Plug 
No major 
failures that 
affect process 
outcome
AMT Fails to 
Perform Task
Delay in 
performing task.
Very Low Not Critical 
Ensure AMTs 
follow work 
schedule 
Remove Oil 
Drain Plug 
No major 
failures that 
affect process 
outcome
AMT Fails to 
Perform Task
Delay in 
performing task.
Very Low Not Critical 
Ensure AMTs 
follow work 
schedule 
Drain Oil 
No major 
failures that 
affect process 
outcome
AMT Fails to 
Perform Task
Delay in 
performing task.
Very Low Not Critical 
Ensure AMTs 
follow work 
schedule 
Cut and 
Remove Lock 
Wire from Chip 
Detector 
No major 
failures that 
affect process 
outcome
AMT Fails to 
Perform Task
Delay in 
performing task.
Very Low Not Critical 
Ensure AMTs 
follow work 
schedule 
Examine Chip 
Detector 
AMT fails to 
notice debris on 
chip detector. 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Engine could fail 
if chips are not 
properly 
detected. 
 
Added cost to 
replace 
damaged chip 
detector.
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Clean Chip 
Detector 
AMT fails to 
properly clean 
chip detector 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Engine could fail 
if chips are not 
properly 
detected.
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Replace Chip 
Detector 
AMT fails to 
properly install 
chip detector 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Debris could be 
placed back into 
engine. 
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Lock Wire Chip 
Detector 
AMT fails to 
properly lock 
wire chip 
detector 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Oil could leak 
past chip 
detector. 
Threads of chip 
detector could 
be damaged. 
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Replace Oil 
Drain Plug 
AMT fails to 
properly install 
oil drain plug 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Chip detector 
could become 
lose and fall out, 
leading to loss of 
engine oil. 
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Lock Wire Oil 
Drain Plug 
AMT fails to 
properly lock oil 
drain plug 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Engine oil could 
leak out. 
Oil drain plug 
could become 
damaged. 
Moderate Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
Replace Oil 
AMT fails to 
properly replace 
oil 
AMT Fails to 
Properly 
Perform Task
Oil drain plug 
could become 
loose and fall 
out. 
Oil drain plug 
could become 
damaged. 
Low Critical 
Training, 
procedures, and 
inspection 
oversight 
   
Engine could 
fail. 
   
Table 5. Complete FMEA for Chip Detector Task 
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Fig. 1. Event Tree 
 
 
Table 6. Accident Sequence 
 
 
Table 7. Event Sequence with Probabilities 
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This result of this analysis tells us that the probability derived for a fire in which the fuel 
feed system stops fuel supply to engine actuates and the consequence in minimal damage is 
approximately 1/1000 or 1X10-3.  The probability derived for a fire in which the fuel feed 
system fails to actuate, but the fire suppression system successfully extinguishes the fire and 
there is only moderate damage is 1E-6 or 1X10-6.  Finally, the probability that a fire occurs 
and both the fuel feed system fails and fire suppression system fails and severe damage 
occurs is 1E-8 or 5X10-8. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Event Tree with Path Probabilities 
This approach is considered inductive in nature.  Meaning the system uses forward logic. A 
fault tree, discussed below, is considered deductive because usually the analyst starts at the 
top event and works down to the initiating event.  In complex risk analyses event trees are 
used to describe the major  events in the accident sequence and each event can then be 
further analyzed using a technique most likely being a fault tree (Modarres, M., 2006).   
As indicated, the fault tree begins at the end, so to speak.  This top-down approach starts by 
supposing that an accident takes place (Vesely, William; et. al., 2002).  It then considers the 
possible direct causes that could lead to this accident.  Next it looks for the origins of these 
causes.  Finally it looks for ways to avoid these origins and causes.  The resulting diagram 
resembles a tree, thus the name.   
Fault trees can also be used to model success paths as well.  In this regard they are modeled 
with the success at the top and the basic events are the entry level success that put the 
system on the path to success.  
The goal of fault tree construction is to model the system conditions that can result in the 
undesired event.  Before construction of a fault tree, the analyst must acquire a thorough 
understanding of the system. A system description should be part of the analysis. The 
analysis must be bounded, both spatially and temporally, in order to define a beginning and 
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endpoint for the analysis.  The fault tree is a model that graphically and logically represents 
the various combinations of possible events, both fault and normal, occurring in a system 
leading to the top event.  The term “event” denotes a dynamic change of state that occurs to 
a system element.  System elements include hardware, software, human, and environmental 
factors (Vesely, William; et. al. 2002). 
Table 8 shows the most common fault tree symbols.  These symbols represent specific types 
of fault and normal events in fault tree analysis.  In many simple trees only the Basic Event, 
Undeveloped Event and Output Event are used.  
 
 
Table 8. Common Fault Tree Symbols 
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Events representing failures of equipment or humans (components) can be divided into 
failures and faults.  A component failure is a malfunction that requires the component to be 
repaired before it can successfully function again.  For example, when a turbine blade in an 
engine breaks, it is classified as a component failure.  A component fault is a malfunction 
that will “heal” itself once the condition causing the malfunction is corrected.  An example 
of a component fault is a switch whose contacts fail to operate because they are wet.  Once 
they are dried, they will operate properly. 
Output events include the top event, or ultimate outcome, and intermediate events, usually 
groupings of events.  Basic events are used at the ends of branches since they are events that 
cannot be further analyzed. A basic event cannot be broken down without losing its 
identity.  The undeveloped event is also used only at the ends of event branches.  The 
undeveloped event represents an event that is not further analyzed either because there is 
insufficient data to analyze or because it has no importance to the analysis. 
Logic gates are used to connect events.  The two fundamental gates are the “AND” and 
“OR” gates.  Table 9 describes the gate functions and also provides insight to their 
applicability. 
There are four steps to performing a Fault Tree Analysis: 
1. Defining the problem 
2. Constructing the fault tree 
3. Analyzing the fault tree qualitatively 
4. Documenting the results 
 
 
Table 9. Logic Gates 
A top event and boundary conditions must be determined when defining the problem.  
Boundary conditions include: 
 System physical boundaries 
 Level of resolution 
 Initial Conditions 
 Not allowed events 
 Existing Conditions 
 Other Assumptions 
Top events should be precisely defined for the system being evaluated.  A poorly defined 
top event can lead to an inefficient analysis.   
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Construction begins at the top event and continues, level by level, until all fault events have 
been broken into their basic events.  Several basic rules have been developed to promote 
consistency and completeness in the fault tree construction process.  These rules, as listed in 
Table 10, are used to ensure systematic fault tree construction (American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers, 1992). 
 
 
Table 10. Rules for Constructing Fault Trees 
Many times it is difficult to identify all of the possible combinations of failures that may lead 
to an accident by directly looking at the fault tree.  One method for determining these failure 
paths is the development of “minimal cut sets.”  Minimal cut sets are all of the combinations 
of failures that can result in the top event.  The cut sets are useful for ranking the ways the 
accident may occur and are useful for quantifying the events, if the data is available.  Large 
fault trees require computer analysis to derive the minimal cut sets, but some basic steps can 
be applied for simpler fault trees: 
1. Uniquely identify all gates and events in the fault tree.   
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2. If a basic event appears more than once, it must be labeled with the same identifier each 
time. Resolve all gates into basic events.   
3. Gates are resolved by placing them in a matrix with their events. 
4. Remove duplicate events within each set of basic events identified. 
5. Delete all supersets that appear in the sets of basic events. 
By evaluating the minimal cut sets, an analyst may efficiently evaluate areas for improved 
system safety.  The analyst should provide a description of the system analyzed, a well as a 
discussion of the problem definition, a list of the assumptions, the fault tree model(s), lists of 
minimal cut sets, and an evaluation of the significance of the minimal cut sets.  Any 
recommendations should also be presented.  An example fault tree for the engine fire 
example is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Example Fault Tree 
4. Summary 
This chapter discussed how common risk assessment techniques could be used to perform 
risk assessments of aviation related activities.  As discussed in the very beginning paragraph 
of this chapter, Ostrom and Wilhelmsen (2011) discuss in depth how to use risk assessment 
techniques to analyze a wide variety of systems, tasks, and activities. 
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